


(Mobile library) The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam

The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam

Daniel C. Hallin

*DOC | *audiobook | ebooks | Download PDF | ePub*



DOWNLOAD



READ ONLINE

#687475 in Books imusti 1989-04-14Ingredients: Example IngredientsOriginal language:EnglishPDF # 1
9.00 x .76 x 6.00l, .92 #File Name: 0520065433304 pagesUniversity of California Press | File size: 62.Mb

Daniel C. Hallin : The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam:

0 of 1 people found the following review helpful. Refutes the Idea that the Media "Lost" VietnamBy RDDIn "The 'Uncensored War': The Media and Vietnam", Daniel C. Hallin argues, The apparently growing prominence of the media coincided with what seemed to be a crisis in political institutions: public confidence in government declined dramatically during these years, public attachment to both political parties weakened, and the political system began a

twenty-year period during which not a single president would serve two full terms of office. These developments, along with Vietnam, have provoked a broader controversy about the relation of the media to the institutions of American government (pg. 4). Hallin focuses on the print media and television. He follows print stories chronologically, but admits a gap in the record of television stories as most were not recorded nor did stations keep detailed transcripts of content. Despite this, he is able to refute the idea that the media was solely responsible for a loss of American will to fight. Hallin writes, It is only in the context of a certain political climate and a certain conception of what journalism is about that an administration's control of information can give it this kind of control [as in the Gulf of Tonkin incident] over the content of the news (pg. 21). He continues, The president's power to control foreign affairs news in the early 1960s rested primarily on two factors. The first was the ideology of the Cold War: the bipartisan consensus, forged during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, that had identified foreign policy with national security, and hence removed most foreign policy decisions from the agenda of political debate (pg. 24). Secondly, professional journalism's commitment to objectivity relied on official facts from the government. Hallin continues, Where consensus reigns, however, they [journalists] rely as heavily as anyone else on the symbolic tools that make up the dominant ideology of their society (pg. 50). He argues, The continuing strength of the Cold War consensus is no doubt the most important reason the [Johnson] administration was able to contain the debate over Vietnam policy (pg. 61). Hallin further argues, In many ways, the professionalization of journalism in the United States has strengthened rather than weakened the tie between press and state (pg. 64). Hallin writes of early television coverage of the war, While the coverage of a paper like the Times had a dry and detached tone, television coverage presented a dramatic contrast between good, represented by the American peace offensive, and evil, represented by Hanoi (pg. 118). Beyond this, Television, moreover, tends to thematize that is, to simplify and unify not only within a particular story or broadcast, but over time as well. Television tends, in other words, to pick out a limited number of ongoing stories and cover them day in and day out (pg. 120). Hallin continues, Television reporting of Vietnam was structured primarily by a different, much less conscious level of ideology: it was structured by a set of assumptions about the value of war not so much as a political instrument, but as an arena of human action, of individual and national self-expression and by images and a language for talking about it (pg. 142). In examining the media itself, Hallin writes, From 1961 to 1967, for all the tension between the media and government, and for all the mythology about the press as an adversary or watchdog of the state, the independence of the American news media at least those parts of it we are covering here was very limited (pg. 162). This changed, as By 1968, the establishment itself and the nation as a whole was so divided over the war that the media naturally took a far more skeptical stance toward administration policy than in the early years (pg. 162). Even with this change, For the most part, television was a follower rather than a leader: it was not until the collapse of consensus was well under way that television's coverage began to turn around; and when it did turn, it only turned so far (pg. 163). Hallin concludes, It is not clear that it would have been much different if the news had been censored, or television excluded, or the journalists more inclined to defer to presidential authority (pg. 213). Further, The collapse of America's will to fight in Vietnam resulted from a political process of which the media were only one part (pg. 213).

7 of 10 people found the following review helpful. Fabulous critique of the "left media" myth
By Kali Tal
Hallin demolishes the view put forward first by Peter Braestrup in *Big Story*, and then echoed down the years by conservative apologists for our loss in Vietnam. Braestrup claimed, and popular culture mythology like the Rambo series underlined, the idea that we "won the war in Vietnam," but "lost the war in America." The strongest military promoter of that view was Col. Harry Summers, who contested the view of counterinsurgency specialists like Andrew Krepinovich that a new kind of warfare was necessary in an age of "low-intensity conflict." Hallin surveys the output of "liberal" papers like the *New York Times*, and the *Washington Post* and proves conclusively that their coverage did not become critical of the war until quite late in the game, well after the Tet Offensive.

4 of 6 people found the following review helpful. Pretty strong
By TLR
There are a number of books about the mainstream media's coverage of the Vietnam War, and this is a very good one. He demonstrates how the corporate press hid behind "objectivity" for many years to avoid really deeply analyzing the war and telling the full truth to the American people.

This book was finished in the tenth year after the end of the Vietnam War. The year 1985 was also the year of Rambo, and of a number of other celebrations of the Vietnam War in popular culture. It was the year Congress cut off aid to the "Contras" in Nicaragua, and then abruptly reversed itself and approved "humanitarian" aid to support the guerrilla war in that country. The "Vietnam Syndrome" showed signs of giving way to the "Grenada Syndrome": the fear of repeating the Vietnam experience showed signs of giving way to a desire to relive it in an idealized form. The nation seemed deeply confused about its identity as an actor in world politics, and thus particularly vulnerable to appealing myths. So it is a good time to take a sober look back at the nation's consciousness during the Vietnam War itself-- which as we shall see, despite the popular image of an independent media demolishing the nation's illusions, was also governed by a powerful mythology, born in part out of the traumas of earlier wars.

"A first-rate book which throws new light on the topic...based on scholarly analysis of what actually was published

and broadcast, judged in the context of historical events.... The first serious revisionist history of the role of the press in Vietnam."--The Washington Post Book World. "The value of Hallin's study lies not only in his research but also in his grasp of the real failure of American journalism in Vietnam--a failure to give its readers or viewers even the most rudimentary understanding of the real issues and true nature of the war."--The Philadelphia Inquirer. "This splendid study of the way the media actually covered the war is among the best and most important books published on the war in Vietnam."--History Book From the Inside Flap"The role of the U.S. press in the Vietnam war, the subject of persistent controversy for more than a decade, raises important issues for journalism, government and American society as a whole. Here is a first-rate book which throws new light on the topic rather than generating more passion and which is based on scholarly analysis of what actually was published and broadcast, judged in the context of historical events."